The paper approaches the rise of far right populism in Europe with a feminist lens and on the background of the discursively constructed sexist and racist features of the current moral panic debate. It is argued that we can follow up a continuum of normalised culturalist gendered discourses in Europe, and in the Netherlands in particular, for some time. The paper is organised by looking, first, at the place of gender in far right discourses and the role of women in far right wing populist parties. Second, a feminist critique of processes of normalisation is presented helping to clarify the term 'culturalism'. To illustrate the dynamics of gendered culturalism and the way it impacts the everyday life of Muslim women in the Netherlands, some interview sequences of an empirical study (2012) with female Dutch-Moroccan citizens are discussed. The experiences of the women illustrate how far right populist perspectives and prejudices entered their daily lives, and which counter strategies, the women used to resist intimidations. The paper concludes that foremost the Dutch far right and the PVV party leader, Geert Wilders, were successful in normalising gendered culturalist views about Muslim minority women vis-a-vis a 'pseudo-emancipatory' nativist claim of cultural superiority with respect to majority women (and men) in liberal European societies.
Introduction
In 2014, Lum and Renaudiere argued that Muslims were stigmatized 'for being violent and for not integrating, but also, for not practicing gender equality and tolerating homosexuality' and 'in far right discourse, gender equality is assumed for have already been conquered in "civilized" Europe'.
ii The New Year's 2015/2016 large scale sexual attacks on non-migrant women in German public spaces near the main train stations in Cologne and Hamburg, but also in Zurich, Switzerland, for example, drive current far right populist debates on the 'integration and gender equality skills' of new immigrants, and North African male refugees iii , in particular. The link between gender and sexuality is crucial here, too, as in a hegemonic perspective liberal Western and secular Christian societies are identified with female sexual independence, e.g. the domestic
and public boundary with respect to the preference and performance of sexuality, and further, freely moving in public spaces is regarded as a fundamental individual human and civic right, equally for men and women. However, public debates on 'sexuality' often get equated with non-heterosexuality that means identified with homosexuality: the public display of sexual preferences (Piekut et. al. 2013 ) has become both, a signifier of 'progressive individual
Western life style' and therefore, a token of liberal society, as well as a racialised boundary marker to 'non-secular' religious minority groups (Vieten 2011; . Heterosexuality and heteronormativity shape public discourse (Valentine 1993; Cooper 2004; Vieten 2014 ) despite more recent interventions by queer studies scholars (Lugones 2007; Kulpa and Silva 2016) little has changed in the national imaginary of a normative common sense of what counts as hegemonic heterosexual and normal sexual identity. Queer scholars such as Puar (2007) argue that gay rights have become a boundary technology to depict the Otherness of Muslims.
According to Yilmaz (2015: 38) 'The dichotomous constellation of cultures with gender and sexuality as baselines is symptomatic of the way sociopolitical divisions are imagined, and acted upon, in public discourse.' The '(hetero-)sexual' sexing of a national group boundary highlighted here is relevant to the current 'moral panic' rhetoric and the rise of far right populist parties: the topic of sexual violence against 'native' women in the public space signifies the liberal society's outrage. Unlike domestic sexual violence it conveys ideologically loaded messages also referring to a symbolic 'imagined' boundary between as 'native' addressed women (victims) and the 'non-native' Other men (perpetrators).
On the background of an essentialist binary between 'woman' ascribed as belonging to the dominant collective, and the 'foreign' man, the question occurs what the situation, and agency of the ascribed 'non-native' woman in the public domain might be? Is she assigned to the domestic sphere, and does not have a public voice and role to play in the public and political imagination of the majority collective? In what ways are female Muslim minority citizens affected by gendered anti-Muslim racism and the normalization of far right policy discourses and politics?
In this paper, I will link some of the discursively constructed sexist and racist features of the current moral panic debate with the rise of far right populism underscoring a continuum of normalising culturalist gendered discourses in Europe.
To illustrate these processes of normalising gendered culturalism, later I will refer to findings of a study in the Netherlands, conducted in 2012. iv The experiences of my interview partners underline racist dynamics of majority claims of nativism and cultural superiority.
Majority claims are encompassed by processes of normalisation; a normalisation of culturalized prejudices and anti-Muslim racism intertwined with sexism that predates the recent success of far right parties in various EU Member states. Yilmaz (2012: 369) points out that there has been a shift in the European political and discursive landscape as 'culture has become central to the questions of belonging and alterity, that is, the ontology of the social has become culturalized'.
The apparently sudden rise of far right populism has to be understood as triggered by a moral panic associated with newly arrived and arriving non-European migrants and refugees since late summer 2015, and a frequency of extremist terrorist attacks in cities such as Paris, Brussels and Istanbul, for example. However, far right and racist perceptions have been growing and being established since the 1990s, and this has to be explored more in-depth in different countries.
As it is argued here, the rise of far right populism is embedded in particular national context of gendered anti-Muslim racism and culturalism that adds to the global phenomenon of Islamophobia (Morgan and Poynting 2013) . Here, the research contributes to the exploration of culturalism (Ghorashi 2010) , the role of women in the construction of national group boundaries (Yuval-Davis 1997) and everyday racisms (Essed 1991; Essed and Hoving 2014) .
More specifically the situated context of the Netherlands is used here as a show case for a more general tendency: societal consensus shifted to the acceptance of a far right political rhetoric as well as to gendered anti-Muslim policy interventions, over years There is an emerging literature on individual narratives of Muslim women in the Netherlands, more broadly (see for example, Roggeband and Verloo 2007; Ghorashi 2010; Ghorashi and Vieten 2013; Eijberts 2013 ). I look, however, at politically active female Moroccan-Dutch minority citizens, who experience the normalization of gendered culturalism and anti-Muslim racisms in their daily life, and the way they cope with this.
What is important to acknowledge is that despite a widespread discourse of gendered culturalism and anti-Muslim racism a new generation of female Muslims and 'new' minority citizens challenge gender stereotypes, which are associated with the 'Muslim woman' and her victimhood in the Netherlands. 
Gender and populism
Gender has a particular role to play in the current far right populist discourses as the gender division understood as ascribed masculine or female sex character shape societies with respect to the way private, semi-private/ semi-public, and finally, public space, is open to individual participation of and performances for women and men. According to Valentine ET. al. (2014: 402 Following these structural considerations the challenge for critical feminist interventions in current debates is to analyse the tension of far right populism and gender, in particular when speaking of 'emancipatory' rights of woman. As argued above, 'woman' in a national (ist) context is regarded as the 'native' woman, and discursively constructed in opposition to the 'non-native' migrant woman. Mudde (2004 Mudde ( , 2013 ix , argues that 'nativism' is one of the core elements of far right populism. This nativism could be regarded as an ideology that constructs an overlap between territory (space) and inhabitants (nation) claiming exclusivity for the native group (e.g. imagined as homogenous-autochthon). Wodak (2013) highlights that this nativist ideology and an exclusionary chauvinism characterise most prominently far right populism.
The terminology of a so called 'nativism' has been criticised by Yuval-Davis (2011) arguing that 'autochthony' might be a better fit to a 'racist discourse which uses origin, To summarize, anti-Muslim rhetoric appears as twined with a twisted 'pseudoemancipatory' (Wodak 2013: 28) gender discourse. Betz (2013: 73) acknowledges, too, that the Swiss campaign against minarets, also adopted a 'defence of women's rights ' (ibid) rhetoric to make a case that Islam, and gender segregating mosques might be here regarded as a male dominant Muslim space, which 'is sanctioning the subordination of and discrimination of women' (ibid). What is striking is the broad ideological attempt to 'normalize' far right politics. Meret (2015: 100) emphasizes that 'Mother of three, Marine Le Pen managed, as the new FN president, to launch a comprehensive plan of so-called "de-demonization" that attempted to "normalize" the party from within, and transform it into a "catch-all protest party"'.
Hence, it needs further exploration how 'normalisation' is depicted, and -in consequence -how we can understand processes of normalisation of far right populism, gendered culturalism and its anti-Muslim racism. As the focus of this paper is on the Netherlands, in the following the dynamics of gendered culturalism are explained and applied to the Dutch 
Normalising everyday far right discourse: gendered culturalism in the Netherlands
While far right politics, e.g. populism, has gained ground in recent years the process of culturalising difference and projecting Muslims as the 'deviant' Other (Ghorashi 2006; 2010) developed since the 1990s in Europe. According to Stolcke (1995: 4) it is 'cultural fundamentalism' that stretches across Europe creating a rigid boundary between secular (Christian) majorities on the one hand, and religious (Orthodox) Islam minorities on the other. Van den Berg and Schinkel (2009: 395) argue that
[t]he Dutch discourse on minorities, immigration and integration has historically been characterized by three phases: (1) a pluralist phase: (2) a phase which emphasis was placed on structural differences and lower structural status in terms of work and education; and (3) a phase in which cultural differences were underlined. The current discourse on gender and minorities can be regarded as a specific branch of culturalist discourse.'
The third phase, dominated by culturalist, or gendered culturalism, became more apparent with the public interventions by opponents of multiculturalism, particularly by Fritz
Bolkestein ( This culturalism encompasses mainstream Islamophobic views (Wodak 2013; Wodak and Reisigl 2015) , and has turned into a 'normalised' gendered lens to view religious-cultural group differences. That means culturalist gendered projection became 'normalised' in a few years, and turned into a hegemonic lens yet before far right parties gained significant ground in parliaments across Europe. According to Young (2000: 86) hegemony 'refers to how the conceptual and normative framework of the members of a society is deeply influenced by premises and terms that make it difficult to think critically about aspects of their social relations or alternative possibilities of institutionalisation and action'.
Hence, hegemony could be understood in this culturalising Otherness-context, as 'normalisation' though is not only confined to control mechanisms of modernity (e.g. the binary of 'traditional vs. modern/ progressive') but aims to problematize the imposition of a certain way of thinking. If it is linked to 'naturalisation' it creates a certain knowledge that is generalised as true and essentialist. Foregrounding processes and dynamics of normalisation also allows to look at the power struggle between concrete actors, the public space and how the 'abnormal' and the 'normal' is positioned temporarily. (Butler 2008) In a comparative study of anti-immigrant parties' programmes in Norway and the Netherlands, Akkerman and Hagelund (2007: 208) pinpointed that 'there is a tension between a neo-liberal programme that emphasizes freedom of choice and the political paternalism inherent in a radical uniculturalist position.' The 'uniculturalist' perspective spells out the renunciation from multi-culturalism to mono-or 'uniculturalism'. The latter conveys the racist features of what has been described earlier as gendered culturalism.
In the final section of this paper, I will take the 'nativist and "liberal" agenda' to an empirical side of investigation, and demonstrate how some politically active minority Muslim women cope individually with gendered culturalised perceptions and illustrate the ways 'day to day' far right populism and gendered culturalism became normalised in the Netherlands. As Ten grew up in a working class environment and realized social upward mobility due to educational choice and individual ambition. All semi-structured interviews were verbatim transcribed; they lasted around 1 and a half hours. 'We wanted to be part of the dialogue, debates and those kind of things, we also wanted to say our thoughts, but there was no space for that, because they just wanted to hear what they thought…For example, our own community, the Moroccan community has managed one of the hundred percent organisations here in the Netherlands, it is called Samenwerkingsorgaan voor Marokkanen xvii … When they invited people they didn't invite the Moroccan people who also were very politically active, but they invited the Dutch who they thought to be much more intelligent or to have more knowledge about the theme.'
Orla characterizes her encounters with majority Dutch people as that of paternalism.
Dominant was the feeling of being disregarded and not taken seriously as a political and eloquent voice.The group boundary between ethnical Dutch and hyphened Dutch, particularly
Moroccan Dutch, seems to be fixed and encapsulated in a clear hierarchy: Yanow and van der Haar (2013) expose the taxonomy of racialised social categories in the Netherlands, e. g.
'autochtoon' (of Dutch heritage) and 'allochtoon' (of foreign birth). Whereas 'race' is rarely used in public discourse, this taxonomy functions as a surrogate for a similarly racializing subordination of the foreigner as a cultural stranger (ibid). Further, both categories also have been xviii used in the media, policy and academia since the 1970s and, in consequence, reproduce constantly an imagination of two separate population groups, being grouped according to a lineage of territory and heritage.
Another interview partner, Naomi, who was an elected MP with the party Groenlinks, and living in Amsterdam, too, reflects on the 1990s. She shares her view on the construction of (ethnic) group differences in the Netherlands, predating the later political murders and terrorist attacks.
'I don't really agree with people who say, Holland was such a tolerant country, such a multicultural country. It was a multiethnic country but it was also a segregated country. I still have a lot of white Dutch friends who only know me as a token, a kind of their own unique example of the allochtone gemeenschap in their close by. So it wasn't really multicultural to begin with actually and I think it's more multicultural now than it has ever been since you have these youngsters However, she also admits that the mingling of 'different' groups is easier today than it used to be.
Nadine, who works as a consulter and previously as a researcher, also lives in
Amsterdam. She describes the legacy of 'culture' and cultural difference as rooted in the ways Dutch society approached the Moroccans, previously.
'In the 70's cultural differences were most important differences. And now cultural difference is important. At first it was a good thing. Cultural differences is something that you have to acknowledge. And now it is if you have a cultural backward position it's your own fault and-so cultural differences are at the forefront again. And now we are 30 years later. And it's, the new buzzword, in critical and public discourse.'
All my interview partners agreed on the outstanding role 'culture' played previously in the context of 'multiculturalism', and the polarizing role it plays now in the Dutch discourse of culturalism. Whereas this suggest a continuity in focus on 'culture' as grouping category,
we also talked about the shifts in public debates and private encounters triggered by political violence. When I was touching on the political murders that took place in the Netherlands, Orla, for example, confessed that she became witness to the murdered film director, van
Gogh.
'I think 9/11, was one of the most ingrijpende gebeurtenissen xix , also for our lives, Apart from a traumatising experience as, by chance, being that close to the (prominent) victim of a crime, the racialisation of Orla as 'your kind of people did it' appears as typical populist racist perception, threatening not only my interview partner, but turning an individual criminal act into the general responsibility of and blame against all Muslims.
Fatma, another interview partner, who was engaged with a local NGO in Maastricht, felt completely excluded from the overall national and international, mourning of the 9/ 11 victims.
'So as if this attack is not mine….as if I couldn't be shocked as equally as you are. I think that is the biggest pain and maybe not even the anti-Islamic attack cause.
I was already used to be attacked for being a Moroccan, as a foreigner. I could not claim that this attack was not big for me as it was for you. It was just taken away from me.'
She expresses her deep shock that she was not seen as part of the 'mourning community' but instead addressed as someone close to the ideology of the perpetrators. Otherwise, she rather agreed with Naomi that it was the local and domestic appearance of far right politicians, e. g.
Pim Fortuyn, and the experiences that some of her school mates were fond of him, that exposed her more directly to the shifted public discourse in the Netherlands.
'When 9/11 happened, nothing really changed, but then Pim Fortuyn came up. For Fatma these experiences also motivated her to become more politically engaged.
Looking at the lack of acknowledgement of the deeds of past politics, Naomi judged the current state of discourse in the Netherlands as the absence of dealing with facts: 'We have a fact free politics nowadays.' She argued that the turn to far right politics also meant to forget 'the facts' about previous policies: and policy, until recently. The current development to far right populism has to be contextualised against these established racialising discourse.
Despite a majority consensus downplaying the 'normalisation' of gendered anti-Islam racism and gendered culturalism, female Muslim minority citizens balance personal experiences with this institutionalised everyday racism individually, and also engage politically based on their claim to be Dutch, and of 'having a right to have rights' (Arendt 1994 ).
